Ore carrier “Stellar Banner” Ran Aground Because Captain Changed planned Route: Report

On 24 February 2020, the Republic of the Marshall Islands-registered VLOC STELLAR BANNER, managed by Polaris Shipping Co. Ltd. (the “Company”), contacted the bottom after departing from Ponta da Madeira, Federative Republic of Brazil (“Brazil”), while laden with 294,871 MT of iron ore. The ship’s hull was damaged, resulting in flooding of multiple voids and WBTs.

The ship anchored while the crewmembers assessed the damage and attempted to control the flooding using fixed and portable pumps. After several hours, it was determined that sea water was flooding the damaged voids and tanks faster than the fixed and portable pumps could pump it out. Based on this assessment, the Master moved STELLAR BANNER to shallower water and intentionally grounded the ship on the morning of 25 February 2020.

Between 12–26 March 2020, the salvors removed 3,500 MT of fuel oil and 140 MT of diesel fuel that had been on board the ship. The salvors then began lightering the ship’s cargo. By 27 May 2020, about 145,000 MT of cargo had been lightered and the ship was refloated. The ship was immediately towed and re-anchored in deeper water, where a damage survey was conducted. Based on the findings of this survey, it was determined that STELLAR BANNER was a constructive total loss.

On 12 June 2020, STELLAR BANNER was scuttled with the remaining cargo on board approximately 55-60 NM northeast of the entrance to the Baía de São Marcos approach channel in more than 2,700 m of water. All hazardous materials had previously been removed from the ship before it was scuttled.

Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator

The marine safety investigation conducted by the Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator (the “Administrator”) identified the following:

1. Causal factors that contributed to this very serious marine casualty include:
   1. (a)  the Master’s decisions to:
      1. (i)  deviate from the planned route during the outbound transit of Baía de São Marcos; and
      2. (ii)  pass within 1 NM of a 20 m shoal based on limited hydrographic information provided on ENC BR321600;
   2. (b)  that STELLAR BANNER contacted the bottom after deviating from the planned route, resulting in damage to the hull and flooding of multiple voids and WBTs;
   3. (c)  the charted depths depicted on ENC BR321600 and BA Chart 543 in the immediate vicinity of the ship’s position where it contacted the bottom did not provide a clear indication of the full range of depths within the 20-30 m contour or the size of the 20 m shoal that STELLAR BANNER passed over;
   4. (d)  ineffective BRM during STELLAR BANNER’s outbound transit of Baía de São Marcos; and
   5. (e)  the Company’s navigation watchstanding procedures did not provide clear expectations and guidance regarding the use of BRM by members of the ship’s bridge team when the Master has the conn.
2. Causal factors that may have contributed to this very serious marine casualty include:
   1. (a)  the time and the height of the tide used to calculate the ship’s UKC for the leg that crossed the sandbar between buoys Nos. 1-4 did not take the correction factors included in the sailing directions issued by DHN or the terminal operator’s regulations into account;
   2. (b)  the calculated UKC for the leg that crossed the sandbar between buoys Nos. 1-4 was not updated when the ship’s departure from the terminal was delayed due to the late arrival of the pilots;
   3. (c)  the difference between how the 20 m contour near the ship’s position at 21301 was depicted on ENC BR321600 and BA Chart 543;
   4. (d)  the dredged channel that is between buoys Nos. 1-4 and the details of its minimum depth and maintenance are not indicated on either the ENC or the paper charts; and
   5. (e)  the Master’s decision to not anchor and wait for high tide to cross the sand bar between buoys Nos. 1-4.
3. Additional issues that were identified but that did not contribute to this very serious marine casualty include:
   1. (a)  the more than 5 m difference in the water depth the 2/O used to calculate the ship’s UKC and the depth he entered on the spreadsheet that included details for each leg of the ship’s planned voyage; and
   2. (b)  the setting of the echo sounder was changed from the 50 m to the 100 m scale while the ship was inshore of the 50 m contour.Read the full report: Steller Banner report